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Abstract  The shareholders agreement is an agreement 
drawn up by the shareholders when the company is founded, 
or after its foundation, to rule one or more aspects of the 
relationships held by the shareholders. The shareholders 
agreement phenomenon is particularly relevant in the Italian 
context, where it is possible to observe a lot of companies 
with fragmentized ownership in which it is not often possible 
to find an economic subject that holds so many shares to 
manage the company. Therefore, it is interesting to 
investigate the typologies and the diffusion of the 
shareholders agreements of the Italian listed companies, with 
the aim to analyze their influence on the corporate 
governance policies. The paper wants to answer to the 
following question: do some enterprise characteristics exist 
that makes more probable that a company adopt a 
shareholder agreement respects to another one? 
The empirical analysis is developed on the Italian listed 
companies at the date of 30, April 2010, belonging to all the 
sectors classified by Milan Stock Exchange. 
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1. Introduction 
The shareholders agreement is an agreement drawn up by 
the shareholders when the company is founded, or after its 
foundation, to rule one or more aspects of the relationships 
held by the shareholders. 
Such agreement represents one of the tools through which, 
especially in public companies, the shareholders put together 
blocks of shares in order to have the majority in the 
shareholders meetings and to pursuit specific interests. 
The shareholders agreement phenomenon is particularly 
important and relevant in the Italian context, where it is 
possible to observe a lot of companies with fragmentized 
ownership in which it is not often possible to find an 
economic subject that holds so many shares to manage the 
company. By this way, it is possible to observe the 
opportunity to create “management and control groups” that 
could vote in the shareholders meetings on the base of what it 
was decided outside it, in a “pre-company meeting” context. 
In Italy, Legislator allows the shareholders agreements 
(Art. 2341-bis, 2341-ter e art. 122, 123, 124 e 207 del D.Lgs. 
24.2.1998, n. 58), while in business economic theory there 
are different and more critical considerations about those 
aspects (Chemla G., Habib M.A., Ljungqvist A., 2007) [1].  
Starting from such considerations, it may be considered 
that the shareholders agreements could be interpreted as 
elements in evident contrast and antithesis with a governance 
able to even manages the minority interests and the interests 
of potential investors.  
It seems quite clear that if we consider the governance as a 
discipline whose primary aims are to resolve the problem of 
company control and to guarantee a high level of 
transparency in ownership structure, the issue regarding 
agreements take out of institutional cannot absolutely be 
neglected. 
The matter regarding the study of the shareholders 
agreement is set with particular emphasis and interest inside 
the Italian economic panorama, where in the last years the 
phenomenon has grown up with an increasing frequency 
both in companies listed to the Milan Stock Exchange and in 
companies not listed; while the first will be the object of the 
research, the latter will not be considered (M. Allegrini, S. 
Bianchi Martini [2]; M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, L. Enriques [3]; 
M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, S. Giacomelli, A. M. Pacces, S. 
Trento [4]; G. Gianfrate [5]; G. Gianfrate [6]; L. Zingales 
[7]). 
Up to the year 2006 the data related to the shareholders 
agreements of the Italian companies listed to Milan Stock 
exchange in Milan were systematically published inside the 
annual report of CONSOB. 
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Table 1.  CONSOB Annual Report 2006 about Shareholder Agreement 
Kind of shareholders agreement in the Italian listed companies 
31 December 2006 
Kind of shareholders agreement 
 
 Block  Vote  Global  Total 
 Number of 
agreements 
Shareholder 
equities 
syndicated 
Number of 
companies 
 Number of 
agreements 
Shareholder 
equities 
syndicated 
Number of 
companies 
 Number of 
agreements 
Shareholder 
equities 
syndicated 
Number of 
companies 
 Number of 
agreements 
Shareholder 
equities 
syndicated 
Number of 
companies 
Mta 
2002 7 31,5 7  8 39,7 8  32 47,6 30  47 43,9 41 
2003 8 39,0 8  11 41,9 9  36 46,9 34  55 44,8 47 
2004 7 50,8 7  10 40,8 8  39 47,8 37  56 46,9 47 
2005 8 32,2 8  10 42,4 8  46 49,1 43  64 45,9 52 
2006 7 45,4 7  8 44,3 4  44 50,0 43  59 48,7 52 
Mtax 
2002 6 38,9 3  3 62,9 3  15 49,1 13  24 48,3 16 
2003 6 30,7 -  - - -  4 44,8 4  10 36,3 9 
2004 4 29,5 -  - - -  7 41,9 6  11 37,4 8 
2005 2 29,0 -  - - -  6 49,6 5  8 44,4 6 
2006 1 25,4 -  - - -  7 50,2 6  8 45,2 6 
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Therefore, it is absolutely interesting to investigate the 
typologies and the diffusion of the shareholders agreements 
in the Italian listed companies, with the aim to analyse their 
influence on the corporate governance policies.  
Starting from those considerations, the aim of the study is to 
understand how corporate governance system of the 
enterprises that adopted shareholders agreements could 
change and influence the traditional management systems.  
In particular, the paper wants to contribute to the corporate 
governance studies trying to understand, trough an empirical 
analysis on the companies listed at the Milan Stock 
Exchange, (i) if some characteristics of enterprise exist that 
makes more probable that a company adopt a shareholder 
agreement respects to an other one, (ii) which characteristics 
assume corporate governance system in the enterprises that 
have shareholder agreements, and, at least, (iii) In which way 
corporate governance of the enterprises could be influenced 
by the presence or the absence of the shareholders 
agreements. 
The paper first describes the institutional context inside 
which it places the discipline of the shareholders agreements, 
analyzing regulatory binds, constitutive characteristics and 
different typologies. The results of the analyses allow to 
shape a theoretical framework on the basis of the studies 
developed in literature. Once identified the research method 
and the sample investigated, the paper reports the results of 
the research and verifies whether shareholders agreements 
are easier present in a certain kind of companies operating in 
particular economic sectors. Eventually the paper describes 
the future steps of the investigation on the shareholders 
agreements in the Italian listed companies at Milan Stock 
Exchange. 
2. The Institutional Context and the 
Theoretical Framework 
The intensive adoption of shareholders agreements has 
forced the Legislator to discipline them, more than to oppose 
them, in order to protected the different interests involved. 
With regard to the not listed companies, the Italian Civil 
Code considers that the shareholders agreements, in 
whatever form stipulated, are intended to stabilize the 
ownership structure or the governance of the company and, 
more specifically, those having for object the voting right or 
the limits to the transfer of shares in companies that control 
or have a dominant influence ex. art 2341-bis c.c. The article 
2341-ter establishes that the shareholders agreements in 
listed companies to Stock Exchange must be published 
otherwise any deliberation taken might be contested. The 
legislative decree n. 58 of February 24 1998 TUF (Unique 
text on the financial brokerage), articles 122, 123, 124 and 
207, rules in punctual way the shareholders agreements in 
listed companies to Stock Exchange. The art. 122 establishes 
that any agreements regarding limitations or regulations of 
voting right, obligation or option of preventive consultation 
for the exercise of voting right, obligations about the transfer 
of shares or any other pact for the arranged purchase, must be 
communicated, to Consob, within five days from the date of 
its underwriting, otherwise the agreement has to be 
considered ineffective. 
Now it is possible to perceive the complexity of the 
matters pertaining to the government and the control of the 
companies, as well as the particular criticality that such 
problems assume in case of companies listed to the Stock 
Exchange to the financial market of the public saving, as 
well as to the growth of the business dimensions and the to 
articulate some organizational models of enterprise. 
The Italian context is set entirely in a peculiar position, 
with own characteristics that compete to define entirely an 
approach particular to the analysis and the resolution of the 
matters pertaining to the companies’ governance. 
Following such optics of investigation, it is evident 
entirely as in the Italian panorama the model of the public 
company doesn't result to be comparable with that developed 
in Anglo-Saxon model and, consequently, also the theories 
and the applicable models in such context can result not often 
usable.  
Regarding the aspects above mentioned, the agency 
relationship, asserted and shared by most part of the 
researchers, has a peculiar and more complex application in 
this field of analyses, because of even if in the most typical 
public companies the managers become autonomous arbiters 
of the decision of the company, in the Italian public 
companies, often owned by groups of few shareholders, it 
could be observed that managers are often the emanation of 
such few shareholder, operating in the exclusive interest of 
these shareholders. Managers, the “agents”, therefore have to 
defend not their own interest, but the interest of groups of 
owners composed by few subject, that is those people who 
have elected them. 
Regarding the issue of the ownership of the enterprises, it 
is very important the presence of a rule that protects the 
general interest to the knowledge of the owner structures, 
and able to recognize the real ownership and size of block of 
stocks through which the company is controlled. To such 
respect, the provided rule from the TUF about the owner 
structure goes beyond the boundaries of the simple 
information about the owners’ equity and the transparency of 
the relations among the shareholders, but it goes to engrave 
on the market of the corporate control. 
A special case that could be mentioned for the relief and 
the diffusion assumed during the last years in theme of 
definition of the owners structure of the company is that of 
the shareholders agreement. The shareholders agreements 
represent a complex and variegated phenomenon, that goes 
to define pacts among the shareholders in order to regulate 
some aspects regarding the execution of the social relation in 
general terms and that, in the substance, partially limiting the 
freedom of the shareholders, involving the obligation from 
the same ones to observe determined behaviours to engrave 
on the operations of the company. Such pacts have been 
disciplined for the first time in Italy with the legislative 
decree 58/1998 TUF, with exclusive reference to the listed 
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companies; for the companies not listed the regulatory 
reference it is even more recent, having been introduced 
during 2003 inside the most general reform of the corporate 
law. 
From the juridical point of view, it is essential to observe 
as the shareholders agreements represent contracts with a 
free form; they only bind the contracting shareholders and, 
consequently, they can’t be opposed, in any way, towards the 
company. In the last years both in the business and 
jurisprudential field many scholars have debated regarding 
the admissibility or less of such agreements. Those people 
who don't hold admissible such types of pacts bring as 
motivation the impossibility to consider the voting right as a 
marketable good 1 . Contrarily, those people who hold 
admissible the shareholders agreements recognize 
admissible the separation between the voting right and the 
linked action; others still consider valid the shareholders 
agreements on the basis of constitutive elements that have 
necessarily to be valued in every single case on the basis of 
the definition of specific behavioural rules or duration. 
Currently, also from the regulatory point of view, it has 
prevailed the thesis it turns to recognize the admissibility of 
the shareholders agreements since they should stay outside 
the social organization, but the right to do not comply with 
the pact if the deliberation of the should cause a breach of the 
social contract. 
From a business and economic point of view, such 
agreements can be general or partial according to two points 
of view. First of all they can be stipulated by all the 
shareholders or only from some of them; secondarily, every 
shareholder adherent to the pact can participate with all of 
her/his shares or only with some of them, absolutely staying 
free to practice to own discretion the correlated social rights 
to the other owned shares. 
More particularly, the finalities that are usually pursued 
with the underwriting oh the shareholders agreements can be 
various and different, but in absolute terms they have all 
incidence on the corporate governance. Particularly, such 
accords can be used in order to: 
- stabilize the corporate government through accords 
aimed to condition the administrative activity and the 
formation of the wish of the meeting; 
- stabilize the owner structure of the company through ties 
to the free trading of the shares. 
The first ones, called “voting right shareholders 
agreements”, are accords that pledge the contracting parties 
to a simple mutual consultation before every meeting; the 
accord could provide ties regarding voting to take place in 
agreement to what it has preventively decided by the 
underwriters’ pact. The second one, called “transferring 
shares right shareholders agreements” are pacts through 
which all the contracting parties, or some of them, are 
obliged not to sell their own stocks or to transfer them under 
specific conditions. Less invasive if compared to the first two 
are the so-called ones “pacts of consultation”, which 
1 Bonelli, 1905; Vivante, 1914; Sequi, 1932. 
essentially bind the parties to discuss and to confer before the 
expression of the vote in the meeting. 
Given such characteristics, it seems quite evident that 
these agreements represent a real limitation of the freedom of 
the single shareholder that underwrites the pact. The 
principal elements of the shareholders agreements are: the 
extraneousness and autonomy of such accords in comparison 
to the social contract, the incidence of such accords on the 
management of the society and on its operations, since the 
principle purpose of the agreement is to handle the relations 
among shareholders differently respect to the company’s 
statute. From one side, therefore, it is possible to observe the 
separation and the independence of the pacts in comparison 
to the company’s statute and, from the other side, the 
incidence of the same on the corporate governance. 
The principal purpose of the shareholders agreements’ 
underwriters is usually to give stability to the government of 
the company or to its structures. Understood the deep 
incidence of the shareholders agreement on the social 
contract, the element that allows to consider not 
compromised all the interests that are protected by the norms 
dictated for the deliberations of the company meeting is the 
possibility that such agreement have a form of publicity; in 
such it is allowed to the shareholders and the third parties to 
know contents and possible incidences on the government 
and on the control of the company. In view of that, the 
legislator through the legislative decrees 58/1998 TUF for 
the listed companies and n. 6/2003 for the not listed company 
has intervened to introduce one specific and detailed 
advertising regime. It is of absolute evidence, in fact, as it is 
absolutely necessary to guarantee the transparency of the 
owner structures of the companies and at same time to 
recognize the freedom to effect the agreement most suitable 
to the pursued finalities. 
3. Research Method 
The research has empirically been developed having as 
goal the analysis of the typologies and the diffusion of the 
shareholders agreements in the Italian companies listed to 
the Milan Stock Exchange with the aim to understand its 
influence on the structuring of the systems of corporate 
governance. 
In agreement with such aims, the empirical analysis is 
developed on the Italian listed companies at the date of 30, 
April, 2010, belonging to all the sectors classified by Milan 
Stock Exchange. 
More in detail, at first the study has individualized and 
selected for investigation the Italian companies listed on 
April, 30th, 2010. about those companies, the analysis 
proceeds to appraise the presence of shareholders 
agreements on April, 30th, 2010. 
The framework is developed finding correlation the data 
collected from all the available documents on the website of 
the company, of Consob and of Milan Stock Exchange 
referring to Ownership, Equity and Board of Directors.  
Particularly, from the website of Consob, the Italian                                                              
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listed companies Regulator, we download all the 
shareholders agreements at April, 30th, 2010 so that to 
make an assessment of the characteristics of those 
shareholders agreements and their impact about structure of 
governance of the selected companies. 
4. The Empirical Analysis 
On April, 30th, 2010 Italian companies, whose shares 
were duly listed at Milan Stock Exchange, were 283. 
Between these companies, 100 had communicated to Consob, 
as rules Article 122 of the Decree Law n. 58 of February, 
24th, 1998, the existence of shareholders agreements having 
as direct or indirect object the voting right or the transferring 
right on their issued shares. 
Table 2.  Listed companies with shareholders agreement 
N of listed companies 
on 30.04.2010 % 
Share Capitalisation of 
listed companies on 
30.04.2010 
(in million of  €) 
% 
283  438.888,94  
N. of listed companies 
with shareholders 
agreements on 
30.04.2010 
 
Share Capitalisation of 
listed companies with 
shareholders agreements 
on 30.04.2010 
(in milion of €) 
 
100 35,34% 130.340,41 29,70% 
The number of companies with shareholders agreements 
represented the 35,34% of the Italian listed companies listed 
to the Milan Stock Exchange and the 29,70% in terms of 
capitalization. This is able to demonstrate that the 
phenomenon since 2006, the year of last publication of the 
data in the annual relationship of Consob, had kept on 
growing.  
By the analysis of the companies having the greatest 
capitalization value on April, 30th, 2010, it emerges that just 
1 among the greatest 5 of those companies (characterized by 
a capitalization superior than 20.000,00 mlns €) has 
shareholders agreements. An interesting consideration can 
be effected subtracting from the value of the overhead 
capitalization of the listed companies that one of the first 4 
companies that don’t have shareholders agreements. 
Table 3.  Share Capitalisation of listed companies with shareholders 
agreements 
Share Capitalisation of companies listed on 30.04.2010 % 
269.857,56  
Share Capitalisation of listed companies with shareholders 
agreements on 30.04.2010  
130.340,41 48,30% 
The table above represented underlines as, operating 
through the hypothesis above described, the relationship 
among the capitalization of the listed companies having 
shareholders agreements in comparison to the capitalization 
of the remaining listed companies results to be of absolute 
relevance, attesting approximately in a value near to 50%. 
In a further step of analysis, it could be observed that the 
phenomenon has cross-functional value because of, apart 
little exceptions, it involves all the economic sectors in 
which Italian Stock Exchange has divided the listed 
companies. 
Table 4.  Shareholder Agreement for sector 
 Sector Total companies for sector 
Shareholders 
agreements for 
sector 
% Capitalization for sector 
1 GOODS 49 15 30,61% 42.038,37 
2 CHEMICAL 5 1 20,00% 655,14 
3 ENERGY 6 0 0,00% 83.995,79 
4 FINANCE 60 31 51,67% 152.636,86 
5 INDUSTRY 65 20 30,77% 40.287,86 
6 WEALTH 7 2 28,57% 4.449,27 
7 CONSUMER SERVICES 31 9 29,03% 18.669,69 
8 PUBLIC TILITIES 19 11 57,89% 72.579,32 
9 TECHNOLOGY 20 9 45,00% 1.968,25 
10 TELECOMUNICATIONS 6 2 33,33% 20.892,18 
11 OTHER 15 0 0,00% 716,21 
  283 100 32,69% 438.888,94 
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The chart above represented allows to answer to a research 
question that wants to verify if come enterprise 
characteristics exist makes more probable that a company 
adopt a shareholder agreement respects to another one. 
It appears meaningful to notice that there are 3 sectors in 
which the observed phenomenon is broadly above the middle 
values. It concerns particularly the sectors Finance, Public 
Utilities and Technology. 
A possible motivation of the strong presence of 
shareholders agreements inside the Public Utilities and 
Technology sectors could be find in the fact that those are 
sectors in which it is possible to see high-intensities 
investments and long period economic return. Such aspect 
would explain the necessity from the partners to stabilize the 
decisions and the structure ownership in the long term 
period. 
To the meantime, as it regards the Finance sector, in the 
chart under exposed it is shown a further examination on the 
base of the under-sectors in which the same main sector is 
divided by Italian Stock Exchange. 
Table 5.  Shareholder Agreement for sub-sector 
 Sub-sector Finance 
Total 
companies 
for 
sub-sector 
Finance 
Shareholders 
agreements 
for 
sub-sector 
% 
     
1 INSURANCE COMPANIES 8 5 62,50% 
2 BANKS 20 10 50,00% 
3 REAL ESTATE COMPANIES 11 4 36,36% 
4 FINANCIAL SERVICES 21 12 57,14% 
  60 31 51,50% 
It is possible to notice that in the sectors of Insurances, 
Banks and Financial services the high presence of 
shareholder agreement could be explained by the fact that the 
assets of such society is characterized by the presence of 
shares in another companies whose management needs a 
stable accord to furnish clear indications to the controlled 
companies. 
With reference to the characteristics and to the typologies 
of the shareholders agreements, the study has found they 
have extremely variegated characteristics. To allow a first 
classification, shareholders agreements could be potentially 
of two typologies: voting right shareholders agreements or 
the transferring shares right shareholders agreements. 
The situations is more complex because of often are 
integrated further clauses, even without specify in which 
classification the agreement is, making more problematic the 
analysis. 
From the analysis made and represented in the chart over 
there, it emerges that it could not exist a prevalence of a 
typology of agreement respect to the other one. 
Table 6.  Kind of Shareholder Agreements 
Kind of shareholders agreements Number of companies 
Voting right shareholders agreements 82 
Transferring shares right shareholders agreements 85 
About this aspect, a further element of absolute interest 
could be furnished considering the companies that have 
adopted both the typologies of shareholders agreements, that 
are 67 in comparison with the wider 100. Therefore, 
prevailing choice when a listed company decides to adopt a 
shareholders agreements seems to be the one to have of both 
individual pacts (vote and block ). 
5. Conclusions 
In conclusion, it is possible to observe that the 
phenomenon investigated presents characteristics of absolute 
relevance. Besides, the analysis has permitted to observe that 
the presence of the shareholders agreements suffers strong 
incidences, in terms of numerical presence and in terms of 
constituted characteristics of the same, in reason of the 
different sectors analysed. It is been able to observe, in fact, 
that some sectors, like Finance, Public Utilities and 
Technology, are that ones in which the shareholders 
agreements have the greater diffusion. 
The considerations due in the course of the analysis are 
necessarily subjective and partial because of they derive 
from a purely descriptive investigation.  
It is also opportune underline that the developed 
observations will have to be necessarily confirmed and 
subsequently deepened by a quantitative analysis that will 
concern mainly the following points: 
1. “qualitative” analysis of the shareholders agreements 
and of the subjects that have indeed stipulated. In short, the 
aim is to analyse the subjects that have set in the shareholders 
agreements (if companies or persons, even belonging to the 
same family), so as to analyse if the agreement has been 
stipulated directly by the owner of the company or by the 
owner of the holding society; 
2. analysis of the ownership and of the characteristics of 
the board of directors (number of managers and 
characteristics of the statutory auditors) of the companies 
that have adopted a shareholders agreements in comparison 
with the governance of the companies that have not adopted 
those agreements; 
3. analysis of the main economic-financial indicators, 
together with the value of the capitalization value of the 
listed companies, with the aim to understand their evolution 
in accordance to the eventual change of the agreements, 
developing the analysis in a comparative level in comparison 
with that companies that, to the contrary, haven’t developed 
those agreements. 
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